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I  Introduction
Same good can be taxed in different countries at very different value-added-tax (VAT) rates. In 
the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), we have observed large diversity 
in the VAT rates and significant changes have been made. Further modification of them is 
waited in the near future. As we can see from the table 1, actual European normal rates vary 
from 15% to 25%.
In France, normal rate came down from 23% (surcharged rate being 33.33%) in 1970’s 
to 18,6% actually. French government is now planning to increase it to 20%. Italian reduced 
rates 9% and 13% have been respectively increased to 10% and 16% in March  1995. The 
government of United-Kingdom has introduced in January 1995 a VAT of 8% instead of 0% 
for energy products. 
The European Commission is preparing a reform which will harmonize the VAT in EEC 
countries. As result of this coming reform, new rates will be between 15% and 20%.
The implication of VAT reform for the EMU is very important. In the third stage of 
transition to European unique money, it  is  required,  according to some proposition,  to peg 
nominal  exchange rates of member countries to some fixed official  parities. Our beginning 
point is that the VAT reform may be inconsistent with the exigency of the Maastricht treaty 
which  requires  stability  of  nominal  exchange  parities,  convergence  of  inflation  rates  and 
satisfaction of other criteria by member countries during this third stage.  
For the purpose of our study, we use a monetary extension (Dai, 1995) of the Cournot 
competition model  proposed by Brander and Krugman (1983). Our objective is to give out 
clearly VAT reform incidences on nominal exchange rates. For not to complicate the issue, this 
one-good-two-country model is suitable. Of course, the nominal exchange rates are influenced 
by many factors. It may in particular be influenced by irrational speculation, changes of real 
exchange terms induced by these in the taste of consumers and the adopted technology package 
in each country, and structural adjustment of tradable and non-tradable sectors.
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We demonstrate clearly the European VAT reform will change significantly the nominal 
exchange rates, i.e. the VAT reform is not neutral for the process of the European Monetary 
Union. Further implication for the purchasing power parity (PPP) literature is that we might 
test econometrically the influence of the VAT reforms in the past periods over the nominal 
exchange rates. Certainly, it  will  not explain  totally the empirical  deviation of the nominal 
exchange rates from its PPP rates1, but it may be an important explication. 
   Countries Reduced rates (%) Normal rates (%)
   Austria 10/12 20
   Belgium 1/6/12 20.5
   Denmark -- 25
   Finland 6/12 22
   France 2.1/5.5 18.6
   Germany 7 15
   Greece 4/8 18
   Ireland 2.5/12.5 21
   Italy 4/10/16 19
   Luxembourg 3/6 15
   Netherlands 6 17.5
   Portugal 5 17
   Spain 4/7 16
   Sweden 12/21 25
   United-Kingdom 8 17.5
Table 1. The VAT rates in EEC (March 1995)
Source: Investir N°1115, Paris
 II.  The Model
Let us assume there are two qualitatively identical countries, one ‘‘domestic’’ and one 
‘‘foreign’’  and each  country has one representative household  and one firm producing the 
same good as  does  its  foreign  rival.  The government  of  each  country spends its  revenues 
(which may come from different kinds of taxes or emission of money) only on the national 
1 See Dornbusch (1987a) for a survey of theoretical and empirical issues about PPP. For a recent survey of 
empirical studies on long-run relation between real exchange terms and PPP, see Froot and Rogoff (1994).
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market. The money is only held by national residents in each country, so there is no problem of 
competition between good and bad currencies.
A. The Problem of Household
It is assumed that the domestic representative household has the following preference 
function2:
C
M
P
c
c



−1
,                                                                                            (1)
where C, M, P, c represent respectively the real consumption, the nominal quantity of money to 
be held by the household for future transactions, the price level of the unique good on the 
domestic market and a constant parameter. 
The household supplies a fixed quantity of labor, noted  N , which is the only factor of 
production. The household’s budget constraint is:
PC M WN M T+ ≤ + + −
−
Π 1 ,                                                              (2)
where  W N M T, , , ,Π
−1  are respectively the rigid nominal wage3, the level of employment 
for  N N≤ , the nominal  profits, the initial  nominal  money balances and the lump-sum tax 
levied by the government4.  
In assuming that the household optimizes its utility function given out in (1) under the 
constraint (2), we can get the following demand functions:
M c WN M T= − + + −
−
( )( ),1 1Π                                                           (3)
PC c WN M T= + + −
−
( ).Π 1                                                                  (4)
2 An interesting extension may be to adopt, rather than this Cobb-Douglas utility function, a more general utility 
function. 
3 We do not give explicitly the reason of rigidity of the nominal wage. One can refer to Stiglitz (1986) for a 
discussion. In their two-country model, Fender and Yip (1994) based the nominal rigidity  of wage on the nominal 
unemployment benefit rigidity.
4 The government finances its spendings with lump-sum taxes and VAT. 
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As the supply of money is perfectly controlled by the central  bank under the floating 
exchange rate  regime,  by the equation  (3)  and  the equilibrium  condition  on  the domestic 
money market, the nominal revenue of the household during the current period is given by:
WN M T
M
c
+ + − =
−
−
Π 1 1
,                                                                   (5)
which is considered, by the domestic and foreign firms, as given.
Using the asterisks to denote the foreign corresponding variables5 and assuming that the 
foreign household has identical preference function and behavior, we can obtain:
M c W N M T* * * * * * *( )( ),= − + + −
−
1 1Π                                                 (6)
P C c W N M T* * * * * * * *( ).= + + −
−
Π 1                                                      (7)
The equilibrium condition on the foreign money market implies that the foreign nominal 
revenue is given by
 W N M T
M
c
* * * * *
*
* ,+ + − =
−
−
Π 1 1
                                                         (8)                   
which is considered similarly to be given for the firms.
B. The Firm’s Behavior
To simplify the model, we do not introduce transport costs incurred in exporting goods 
from one country to the other, and we assume that there is neither trade barriers to international 
trade nor constraints of full employment or other economic and policy constraints. The basic 
idea is that each firm regards the other country as a separate market. Consequently, it chooses 
the profit-maximizing quantity for each country separately. In considering that the other firm 
will hold fixed the quantity of its output sold in both countries, each firm has then a Cournot 
perception. 
5 In the following, the asterisks generally denote corresponding variables associated with the foreign country.
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The domestic firm will sell a quantity x at price P on the domestic market and a quantity 
x*  at price P* on the foreign market. The foreign firm will sell a quantity y at price P on the 
domestic market and a quantity  y*  at price P* on the foreign market. They have respectively 
an increasing return technology of production of the type:6
x x N N+ = −* ,           
        y y N N+ = −* * * ,  
with respectively a minimum of labor N , N* necessary in beginning the period production in 
each country. We assume in this paper, that there is no free entry and exit7. The fact that the 
domestic firm is totally owned by the domestic residents, and the absence of non-monetary 
assets imply that there is no problem of international investment in pursuing higher profits. 
The value-added tax rate is respectively θ , θ *  on the domestic and foreign markets. The 
domestic  and foreign  firms maximize  respectively their  nominal  profit  function8 measured 
respectively in domestic and foreign currency:
 Π = − + − − + +P x EP x W x x N( ) ( ) ( ),* * * *1 1θ θ                                      (9)
 Π* * * * * * *
( )
( ) ( ).=
−
+ − − + +
P y
E
P y W y y N
1
1
θ θ                                  (10)
where E  is the nominal exchange rate of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency. It is 
given for firms9. Given the domestic government nominal spending  G, the domestic central 
bank supply of money, and the quantity of good sold by the foreign firm, y, the domestic firm 
will perceive the following objective demand curve on the domestic market: 
P
G c WN M T
x y
=
−
+
−
+ ( + +Π 1 ) ,                                                               (11)
6 This assumption is introduced to justify the Cournot competition.
7 We can introduce the free entry and exit as Huw D. Dixon does (1994). But the main conclusion will not be very 
different. 
8 The nominal profits maximization is adopted by d’Apremont , Dos Santos and Gérard-Varet (1989), Dixon 
(1994) and other authors. It may be justified by the presence of exogeneously given nominal variables such as 
wage, public spending and lump-sum tax etc..
9 This assumption is necessary for the existence of international trade in this model with only two firms. Otherwise, 
a model with n firms is needed as firms’ quantity and price behaviors become functions of  nominal exchange rate. 
See, Dornbusch, 1987b.
6
taking into account (5), it can be written as:
P
x y
=
+
Ω
,          with   P P x yy x
' '
( )
,= = −
+
Ω
2  Ω = +
−
G
cM
c1
.                  (12)
Similarly, the objective demand for its product on the foreign market can be written as:
         P
x y
*
*
* * ,= +
Ω
    with P P
x yy x* *
*' *'
*
* *( )
,= = −
+
Ω
2  Ω* *
* *
*= +
−
G
c M
c1
.        (13)
Each firm maximizes its nominal profits with respect to its own quantity decisions in 
assuming the quantity decisions of the other  as given. This yields the following first-order 
conditions:
Π x xP x P W
' ' ( ) ( ) ,= − + − − =1 1 0θ θ (14)
Π x xEP x EP W* *
' *' * * * *( ) ( ) ,= − + − − =1 1 0θ θ (15)
Π y
yP y
E
P
E
W*'
'
*
( ) ( )
,=
−
+
−
− =
1 1
0
θ θ
 (16)
Π y yP y P W* *
*' *' * * * * *( ) ( ) .= − + − − =1 1 0θ θ (17)
It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions of optimality are satisfied for the firms’ 
problems.
III. VAT Rates Reform and Nominal Exchange Rate Parity: Implication for European 
Monetary Union
We can complete the model  with the balance of payment equation under  the floating 
exchange rate regime. Under the assumption of no capital and labor movement, the balance of 
payments, identical to the trade balance, must be in equilibrium:
EP x P y* * *( ) ( ) .1 1− = −θ θ     (18)
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In  using  the  partial  derivatives  of  prices  in  (12)  and  (13),  and  the  trade  balance 
equilibrium relation (18), form the first-order conditions, the reaction functions of the firms 
can be deduced as:
y x y−
−
+ =
α
θ1 0
2( ) ,      (19)
yy x y x y x* * * *( )( ) ,−
−
+ + =
α
θ1 0
(20)
xx x y x y y* *
* *( )( ) ,−
−
+ + =
β
θ1 0
(21)
x x y* *
* *( )−
−
+ =
β
θ1 0
2 (22)
to simplify notations, we use α β= =W W
Ω Ω
,
*
*
. 
The equations (12-18) constitute the complete model. Before we discuss the implication 
of the European  VAT reform,  we indicate  that when the VAT rates are  zero,  the absolute 
purchasing power parity (PPP) is verified in the simple model with  EP
P
*
= 1. The nominal 
exchange rate is determined by the following formula10:
E
W
W
=
Ω
Ω* *
. (23)
From this formula, one can see easily that there is no one-to-one relation between the 
money growth rate, inflation rate and exchange rate variation. This is due to the presence of 
sticky wages and that public spending is fixed in nominal terms. Money is not neutral in this 
model,  and  fiscal  policies  can  also  influence  exchange  parity.  However,  the  absolute  and 
relative PPP is verified.
10 See Appendix. 
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The  model  with  value-added  taxes  has  a  unique  non  trivial  solution  satisfying  the 
restrictions  0
1
< <
−
x*
*θ
β , 0
1
< <
−
y
θ
α
,  x > 0, y * > 0,  and  compatible  with  the  firms’ 
reaction functions and the trade balance equilibrium. As x y* = , a modified absolute PPP is 
verified, i.e. 
EP
P
y
x
* *
*
( )
( ) .
1
1
1
−
−
= =
θ
θ     
Or equivalently, we have 
EP
P
*
*
.=
−
−
1
1
θ
θ     
(24)
If  the  value-added  tax  rates  are  the  same  in  the  two countries,  the  absolute  PPP is 
verified. If the value-added tax rates are unchanged, the relative PPP is expected to be true.
An  intuitive  explanation  is  that  firms  are  interested  in  (taxes  deduced)  net  prices 
measured in same currency. As there is no other constraint limiting arbitrage (entry barriers 
combining with macroeconomic asymmetry11), they will make the best quantity decisions so 
that the net prices in the same currency are equal in the two countries. In other word, each firm 
will try to exploit the higher price in one country until the law of one (net) price12 is applied 
and no more profits can be earned in lowing price. 
With VAT,  the nominal exchange rate can be given as:
E
W
W
=
−
−
Ω
Ω
( )
( )* * *
1
1
θ
θ
. (25)
From (25), if it is admitted that only the domestic VAT rate adjusts, the exchange rate 
will vary according to:
∆
∆
E
E
≈
−
−
1
2 1( )θ θ . (26)
11 The macroeconomic asymetry is refered to the different nominal wage/agregated nominal demand. Entry barriers 
can be import or export taxes and transport costs. See Dai (1995) for details.
12 As this is one-good model, we can speak indifferently absolute PPP and law of one price.
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In the case of Germany, the VAT rate is originally at 15%. If it is increased to 20%, the 
deutchmark will  need a reevaluation of about 3% vis-à-vis the currency of another country 
whose VAT rate is already at 20%. Otherwise, the foreign country must devaluate its currency 
in order to prevent the resulting external disequilibrium which can incite speculative attacks. In 
the case of Sweden or Denmark, its VAT rate must be reduced to 20%, as the German VAT 
rate is increased to 20%, the reevaluation of deutchmark will be about two times as important 
as in the precedent case, i.e. approximately 6%.
The effort needed to manage pegged nominal exchange parity may be quite high in terms 
of welfare if VAT reform is taking place during the third stage of EMU. Its importance depends 
of course the macroeconomic policies used. As the European governments pursue an objective 
of inflation rate as required by the convergence criteria of Maastricht treaty, the costs may be 
much higher and quickly doubled. That is easy to see. Assume that domestic and foreign prices 
are unchanged, i.e. P and P * are constants, from (24), we have:
∆
∆ ∆
E
E
≈
−
−
+
−
1
1
1
1( ) ( )*
*
θ θ θ θ , (27)
The equilibrating reevaluation of deutchmark will be respectively 6% and 12% in the two 
cases considered above. 
 IV Conclusion
A two-country macroeconomic monetary model with Cournot competition is used here 
in order to show the nominal exchange rate implication of the harmonization of VAT rates in 
EEC. The result is that major modification of VAT rates in EEC has important influence on 
exchange rate parities of European currencies. Policy implication is that the European VAT 
reform must be taken before or after the third stage of EMU, otherwise other macroeconomic 
policies  are  needed  to  defense  the irrevocably  pegged  parities  in  the case  where  external 
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disequilibrium is accentuated and speculative attacks are imminent as a consequence of the 
VAT reform. The costs of these macroeconomic policies may be very high, and they might 
provoke very strong public anti-Maastricht opinions in some EEC countries. 
The above interpretation is meanwhile limited as the model is atemporal, without capital 
and  international  capital  market, without non-traded goods, and the imperfect competition 
introduced is very simple.  An extensive welfare analysis is needed in the case where VAT 
reform is taking place during the third stage of EMU and macroeconomic policies are taken to 
manage the pegged nominal exchange parities between currencies of EEC member countries. 
More theoretical and empirical works are necessary to understand the full implication of past 
and coming VAT reforms.
Appendix:  The Solution of the Model 
The reduced model is as follows:
y x y−
−
+ =
α
θ1 0
2( ) , (A.1)
yy x y x y x* * * *( )( ) ,−
−
+ + =
α
θ1 0
(A.2)
xx x y x y y* *
* *( )( ) ,−
−
+ + =
β
θ1 0
(A.3)
x x y* *
* *( ) ,−
−
+ =
β
θ1 0
2 (A.4)
EP x P y* * *( ) ( ) .1 1− = −θ θ    (A.5)
Note u v=
−
=
−
α
θ
β
θ1 1, * 
, the manipulation of (A.1) and (A.2) gives the following equations:
x
y
u
y= − ,                                                                                                      (A.6)
y
x
v
x*
*
*
= − .                                                                                                (A.7)
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In substituting (A.6) and (A.7) into (A.2) and (A.3), we can obtain: 
y
x
v
x u
y
u
x
v
x( )
*
*
*
*
− − = 0,                                                                     (A.8)
x
y
u
y v
y
u
x
v
y*
*
( )− − = 0.                                                                   (A.9)
we can get after simplification:
y
v
x
u
v
x( )* *
1
0− − = ,                                                                      (A.10)
x
u
y
v
u
y* ( )
1
0− − = .                                                            (A.11)
In using (A.10), it follows:
y
u
v
x
v
x
=
−
*
*
.1
                                                                                         (A.12)
In substituting it into the equation (A.11), we obtain:
x
u
u
v
x
v
x
v
u
u
v
x
v
x
*
*
*
*
*
1
1 1 0
2
−
−










−
−










= .
With the following transformations:
( ) ( ) ,* * * * *1 1 02− − − − =v x v x ux u v x x  
and,
1 2 0− + − + − =v x vx ux ux v x u v x x* * * * * * * ,  
one gets:
( ) ,* *v u x v x− − + =2 1 0
which yields:
12
x
v v v u
v u
v u
v u
*
( )
=
± − +
−
±
−
2
 =  
4 4 4
2
i.e.
x
v u
v u v u v u
x
v u
v u v u v u
1
2
2 2 2
2
2
2 2 2
1
1
*
*
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
=  ,  
=  = ,      
+
+ −
=
−
−
+ − +
Using (A.6), (A.7) and (A.12), we can check easily the only good solution is 
x y
u v
x
v
u u v
y
u
v u v
*
*
( )
,
( )
,
( )
.
= =
+
=
+
=
+
1
2
2
2
The vector ( , , , ) ( , , , )* *x x y y = 0 0 0 0  is also a solution of the model, but it is trivial compared to 
the reality of the world economy. In using equations (12-13) and (18), and the above results, 
the nominal exchange rate is given by:
E
W
W
=
−
−
Ω
Ω
( )
( )* * *
1
1
θ
θ
.
When the VAT rates are zero, i.e. θ θ= =* 0, the non trivial solution is:
x y*
( )
,= =
+
1
2α β
x =
+
β
α α β( ) ,2
y*
( )
.=
+
α
β α β 2
The nominal exchange rate is given in this case by:
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E
W
W
=
Ω
Ω* *
.
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